A VAR Model Of The Relationship Between The GDP Growth And Unemployment Rates by Ekanem, Nkanta Frank
Journal of Business & Economics Research – August 2005                                                          Volume 3, Number 8 
 71 
A VAR Model Of The Relationship Between 
The GDP Growth And Unemployment Rates 





This paper concludes that the failure to realize the anticipated job growth, following the enormous 
fiscal injection since 2001 is mostly due to three reasons: (1) The pervasive low investors’ 
confidence had drastically reduced the investors’ propensity to invest to the extent that little or no 
investment could take place, even if interest rate, which had fallen to its lowest level could be 
allowed to fall further. (2) Many industrial sectors, still saturated with excess technological 
investment acquired in 1998-99, in their attempt to remain Y2K compatible, were trying to make 
effective use of their existing investment and hence had no justification for further investment, and 
this constrained their ability to expand production and create jobs. (3) The pressure to prevent 
corporate profits from falling increased the urge to move industrial plants overseas, especially to 





n January 15 2003, President George W. Bush gave a speech before the Economic Club of Chicago in 
which he laid out his plan for economic recovery. The President said in his speech that signs of economic 
decline were evident as early as the summer of 2000 when “the market had started on a steady decline, 
and the economy and job growth had begun to slow down.” The President informed his audience of the continuous 
state of instability in the economy, in which many who wanted to work could not find a job; and the lack of 
confidence among many employers could not encourage them to invest and create new jobs. He also stated that a large 
number of Americans live in constant or increasing personal debt.  In spite of these, he stated that many familiar 
economic indicators that drive the economy into growth were evident. These include the growing skill and efficiency 
of the American worker. He observed that in the preceding four quarters productivity of American workers has gone 
up by 5.6% which would create a platform for long term growth.   
 
Given these problems, the President went on to announce the centerpiece of the Administration’s 
stabilization package which is built on a series of tax reduction packages. This tax reduction proposal, when passed by 
Congress seeks to “put $70 billion to work in the private economy and to encourage greater investment by individuals 
and small business” to speed up the pace of economic recovery and job creation. As could be expected, the President 
did not present comprehensive economic recovery proposals in one single speech. However, the failure of the 
economy to show signs of recovery several months after the launching of the recovery program, and the President’s 
emphasis on tax reduction policy as a strategy for economic recovery calls for a search for other economic policies 
that may bring about a recovery both in the short and long term.  
 
Given the productivity rate of 5.6%, a national unemployment rate of 6.1%, it appears that the stage is set for 
the economy’s readiness to absorb reasonable expansionary stimulus. The federal government has apparently settled 
on two policy strategies: namely tax reduction, and a massive spending increase. Homeland Security related activities, 
arising from the September 11, 2001 bombings in New York City and Washington DC constitute the bulk of the 
growing trend in government spending.  Many economic indicators are needed to evaluate the prospects for recovery 
and stability. While some of these indicators may be growth enhancing, many are not. Among those indices which do 
not lend themselves to growth is the pervasive decline in consumer confidence. Another is the precipitous drop in the 
revenue collection, and the consequent increase in the reported and projected budget deficit.  
 
O 
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One of the most critical decisions confronting the government is the choice of what stabilization problem to 
address in a way that will make the greatest impact on the economy. From every indication, although stimulating the 
GDP growth rate may be popular, it may however be incapable of creating jobs that the public may expect. In these 
circumstances, should government direct its policies towards bringing about GDP growth or job growth? Whichever 
of these problems government may choose to address, can the solution be found in increased spending and, or tax 
reduction?  Although the analysis of economic instability encompasses a wide range of issues, such as prices, 
unemployment, GDP growth, and the domestic and external imbalance, this study will focus on the causes of, and 
possible solutions for three types of economic instability, namely unemployment, job growth and the GDP growth 
rate. These are three of the issues currently receiving wide media commentary and the public concern on economic 
performance. Superficially, it appears that unemployment and the GDP growth are the same things. Judging from the 
experience since year 2000 when the declining GDP growth in the U.S. economy has generally been associated with 
increasing unemployment rate, one would be inclined to agree with this line of thinking. The paper discusses some 
standard stabilization policies, and inquires into whether such policies have lost their ability to the first recession of 
the 21
st
 century or any others like it. The focus of the study is twofold: to test the hypothesis that the variables which 
explain the variability in the GDP growth are different from those, which explain the variability in unemployment 
rate. The second hypothesis to be tested is that the determinants of the GDP growth, job growth and unemployment 
have lost their predictive power on the business cycle that began in 2000.  
      
NEW TRENDS IN ECONOMIC INDICATORS 
 
The period between 1990 and 2003 reveals an interesting phenomenon of unconventional economy that 
makes it difficult to predict the trends and the cycles precisely. The unconventional nature of the economy during the 
1990’s was characterized by a rapid growth rate without serious inflationary problem. Similarly, the recovery in 2003 
was characterized by its failure to reduce unemployment rate and a failure to stimulate job growth. Except during the 
period of 1970’s through 1989, inflation has not been a serious problem in the United States. However, there were 
some years when annual GDP growth rate was 4.5% or higher, even when inflation rate was 7.5% or higher. The 
absence of inflation threat in the United States during the high growth period of the 1990’s has been credited to the 
combination of the high-tech productivity, and the successful monetary policy of Alan Greenspan. However, the 
situation during the years 2001-2002, during which GDP growth rate dropped precipitously in spite of the absence of 
inflation is at variance with normal economic phenomena. Some blame it on the “unusually rapid productivity growth 
during the recent recession and the vigorous use of monetary policy over the last few years that brought the federal 
fund rate to the lowest level that raises the concern that monetary policy would be helpless in the event of economic 
relapse”, (Auerbach, 2003).  
 
The second and third quarters of 2003, when the GDP growth appeared to have turned back up, 
unemployment rate continued to remain virtually unchanged, indicating that the GDP growth may not be the 
necessary and sufficient solution for unemployment problem. The 1993-2000 era was marked by a rapid growth in 
technology, which stimulated an average annual GDP growth rate of about 4.0%, without the danger of inflation 
usually associated with this rate of GDP growth, and annual unemployment rate of 5.2%. The GDP growth and 
unemployment rates do not reveal a pattern which conforms to a clear theoretical relationship during this period. 
Between 1994 and 1996 when the GDP growth rate fell, unemployment rate also fell, but not in a way that reflected 
the decline in the GDP growth rate. Also between 1996 and 1998 when the GDP expanded, unemployment rate 
recorded only a modest decrease. The recession, which commenced during the fourth quarter of 2000, also brought 
with it an unemployment rate which again failed to reflect the precipitous decline in the GDP growth rate. This leaves 
economists wondering whether conventional economic theory is incapable of explaining some macroeconomic trends 




To explain the variations in the maximum potential output of the economy, a production function model is 
traditionally employed (Evans 2004). The theory asserts that output can be generated through a variously structured 
combination of labor, capital and technology trend. The Cobb-Douglas production function is one of such models 
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frequently used. This study does not deal directly with the production function in the sense of quantity of capital and 
labor, but the related issues of investment acquisition and the use of the existing pool of labor in the economy.      
 
Two causes of the business cycle are investment and technology development. The recession that began in 
2001 has been described as an unusual and unconventional economic phenomenon that was not easy to explain. Some 
economists are inclined to blame the failure of the GDP growth and unemployment rates to respond to the standard 
economic stabilization policy since the beginning of 2001, on the Y2K doomsday scare. The period beginning from 
the summer of 1998 was characterized by the Y2K scare syndrome, which gave rise to a spout of feverish technology 
related investment to stave off the worst consequences of the technology collapse. The Y2K scare led to enormous 
financial and technological investment in many industrial sectors, such as transportation network, banking and several 
others, in their effort to ensure that they were “Y2K” compatible. The surge in Y2K compatible equipment boosted 
the purchase of high-tech equipment from $526 to $561 billion, and led to a temporary surge in profits of high-tech 
firms and their stock prices. By the second quarter of 2000, investment had began to slowdown because the concern 
about Y2K was no longer a real threat. Rightly or wrongly, we may explain these phenomena as part of the so-called 
“surplus “or “shortage” theory described by (Evans, 2004). 
 
Okun’s Law postulates that underutilized resources contribute to fluctuations in real GDP. In this case, the 
unutilized resources are the millions of potential workers looking for jobs that they could not find. Resources are 
under-utilized when aggregate demand falls. Aggregate demand deficiency may be due to inadequate consumer 
spending or inadequate investment demand. Consumer spending averaged above 2.4% per annum in the 1970’s, about 
2% in the 1980’s, about 0.6% in the 1990’s and 0.3% since 2000, (U. S. Department of Commerce). To ensure a 
sustained growth in output, efforts must therefore be made to stabilize consumer and investment spending. According 
to Okun’s Law, unemployment falls (rises) when real GDP grows faster (slower) than potential output. If you know 
what is happening to real GDP relative to potential output, you know a good ideal of what is happening to the 
unemployment rate, and vice versa, (DeLong, 2003). An increase or decrease in consumption will result in a parallel 
increase or decrease in GDP and a corresponding decrease or increase in unemployment rate. 
 
Traditional recovery strategy includes the use of fiscal or monetary expansion or both. However, for these to 
be effective, the economy must neither be close to full employment, nor be threatened by inflation. Fiscal expansion 
involves the funding of public projects and entitlement programs, as well as statutory funding release to the states and 
local to enable them fund their pet projects, such as welfare, public school and poverty projects. Output can be 
explained with lagged output and fiscal policy. Unfortunately, one may not adequately identify the effect of different 
components of the fiscal policies, (Auerbach, et al., 2003). The reason for this is timing, expectations, and whether 
such policy results in more consumption, savings or investment. The problem of timing and uncertain efficacy of 
fiscal policy could be due, among others to the wrong choice of sectoral and program emphasis. This requires that 
monetary policy be harmonized with the fiscal policy. The period since year 2000 has seen a series of interest rate 
reductions in an attempt to encourage private sector initiative in investment and consumer spending and to stimulate 
GDP and job growth. These objectives have remained largely unrealized.  
 
According to (Auerbach, et al., 2003), the variations in output can be explained as follows: 
 
Log(y)  =  0  +  1log(yg(-1)/yp)  +  2log(def(-1)/yp)   +   3log(I(-1)/yp)   +                          (1) 
 
Yg(-1) represents lagged output gap, def(-1) represents lagged budget deficit, I(-1) represents lagged value of gross 
investment, and yp represents potential output,  represents the white noise error term, considered to be normally and 
independently distributed with mean zero and standard deviation y. However, this study departs from equation (1) in 
two respects, firstly our model uses GDP in place of output gap, and government spending in place of budget deficit, 
because of the author’s desire to test the appropriateness of GDP and government spending, assumed to be appropriate 
proxies for these variables. Secondly, we use vector autoregressive (VAR) method for our structural estimation 
technique, being a very suitable estimation technique that can control for shocks to endogenous variables.  The study 
stresses the comparative impact of monetary and fiscal policies on GDP and job growth.          
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THE VAR MODEL 
 
This section presents the VAR models used to explain the relationship between GDP growth rate, 
unemployment rate and job growth, mainly in manufacturing and the services sector. 
 
Xt  =  0   +   iXt-j   +   iZt-j  +  t                                                                       (2) 
 
The right side of equation (2) contains lagged values of the dependent variables Xt-j. Unless the difference operator is 
applied to the error term, this might lead to a loss of information. The error correction procedure is often used to 
prevent this loss of information. The maximum eigenvalue tests allow us to test the hypothesis that there are r co-
integrating vectors against an alternative hypothesis that there are r+1 vectors. Although the VAR model does not 
require a rigorous theoretical formulation, we are presenting, not only a specification between a set of endogenous and 
exogenous variables per say, but also a model that contains some theoretical justifications. The VAR method requires 
that we first conduct a number of tests on the sample. These are respectively, the unit root and the co-integration tests. 
For the unit root tests, we conducted the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF), and the Philips-Perron (PP) tests.  
 
ADF test: yt  =  0  +  1yt-1  +  k yt-k  +  t                                                                                          (3) 
 
PP test:      yt  =  0  +  1yt-1  +  t                                                                                (4) 
 
where yt represents, respectively GDP, overall job growth, job growth in the manufacturing and services sectors, and 
unemployment rate, and  represents the first difference operator. The null hypothesis in the unit root test requires that 
1 = 0 in the ADF test, and 1 = 1 in the PP test. For the co-integration test, we performed the Johansen’s test. If there 
is a linear combination of two or more series, such series are said to be co-integrated and such co-integration results in 
a reduced rank among the series. Engel and Granger (1987) has shown that if a linear combination of two or more 
non-stationary series exists, such linear combinations might by stationary. For a VAR model of the order p, a 
Johansen’s co-integration test uses the following model: 
 
yt  =  A1yt-1  +  ……+  Apyt-p  +  Bxt  +  t                                                                     (5) 
 
where yt represent a k-vector of non-stationary I(1) variable, xt  represents a vector of deterministic variables and t is 
a vector of innovations. The Johansen’s tests permit us to obtain impulse responses and the error decomposition of the 
dependent variables in the VAR models, (Engel & Granger, 1987; Johansen & Juselius, 1990; Eun & Jeong, 1999). 
 
 Following is the brief description and the structural relationship of the instrumental variables in the model 
tested. The dependent variables are GDP growth, overall job growth, manufacturing job growth, and job growth in the 
services sector. Among the independent variables are lagged values of these dependent variables. Others are money 
supply and government spending as a ratio of GDP. No detailed discussion is given here because these are traditional 
instruments to bring about expansion, job growth and inflation control. The desired results are achieved through their 
effects on consumer spending and investment spending. Consumer spending (CS) and investment as a ratio of GDP 
(i/y), although endogenous variables, are included among independent variables with the hope that the reduced form 
procedure in the VAR model will control for the effect of the cointegration. The remaining independent variables are 
consumer confidence and productivity in manufacturing. Although productivity appears to have indisputable 
theoretical significance in a model such as this, consumer confidence does not. Consumer confidence is widely 
believed to affect consumer and investors’ spending behavior, but there appears to be no rigorous theoretical 
foundation for this. 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF THE VAR MODELS 
 
The results of the unit root, and the Johansen’s co-integration tests are presented in Table 1. The results of the 
error correction estimates of the VAR models, and the error decomposition tests are given in Table 2 and Table 3, 
respectively. While Table 1 provides us with the results of the tests performed on the database, to ensure that the 
variables possess the properties that can yield unbiased parameters, Table 2 and Table 3 contain the empirical results 
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of the hypotheses tested. To clarify, these hypotheses are restated here for easy reference. The first is that the factors 
which determine the GDP growth are different from those that determine job growth. For this reason, policies which 
are effective in stimulating GDP growth are often incapable of producing significant job growth. As a result of this, 
significant GDP growth is not always followed by a declining unemployment rate. The link between GDP growth rate 
and unemployment rate is job growth. That job growth is mostly in manufacturing. We believe that emphasizing 
manufacturing job growth by whatever means, including the measures suggested below, will be more effective in 
bringing about job growth and unemployment situations that will be in line with the GDP growth rate. 
 
The second hypothesis is that the conventional methods of bringing about GDP expansion and job growth 
have lost their predictive power on the business cycle of the 21
st
 century. This study has shown that this is not the 
case. On the contrary we found that the over-reliance on fiscal stimulation can be ineffective, especially in the 
economic environment where the monetary instrument cannot stimulate the desired investment spending, due to the 
perverse low investors’ confidence. The empirical results show that, except in the case of job growth in the services, 
and the unemployment rate equations, the fiscal policy variable is not statistically significant. The monetary policy 
variable is however, statistically significant. The variance decomposition shows that when M1 is included, and when it 
is excluded from the VAR models, GDP accounts for a higher proportion of the variances in job growth 
(manufacturing), but much less proportion of the variances in the services job growth when M1 is excluded from the 
VAR model. 
 
The empirical results presented in Tables 2 and 3 are complementary and we intend that they be read 
together. Table 2 shows the structural relationship between the various dependent and independent variables, and 
Table 3 shows the proportion of the variances in the dependent variable explained by a shock to the independent 
variables as indicated. The dependent variables are GDP, overall job growth, manufacturing and services job growth, 
and unemployment. The independent variables are, in particular fiscal and monetary policy variables, corporate profit, 
productivity (manufacturing), consumer spending, ratio of gross private investment to GDP, consumer confidence 
index, and lagged values of the respective dependent variables. To test the comparative impact of the monetary and 
fiscal policy variables, the VAR models are estimated to include M1, and when M1 is excluded. The exclusion of M1 
tests the effectiveness of independent fiscal injection into the economy with little regard to any existing monetary 
policy, as has been the case since 2001, following the series of tax cuts and massive government spending especially 
on Homeland Security-related programs.  
 
This empirical evidence addresses two theoretical facts. (i) In a simultaneous injection of fiscal and monetary 
policy innovations into the economy, monetary innovation tends to exert a dominant impact on the economy because 
of its immediate expansionary effect on domestic investment. (ii) Although the manufacturing sector has been 
declining since 1980’s, due among others, to the so-called “outsourcing” phenomenon, which encourages American 
companies to relocate their manufacturing plants overseas, the link between the GDP growth and the unemployment 
rate is job growth, especially in the manufacturing. It is not quite clear why the services sector, with its 31% share of 
nonagricultural payroll, and about 38% share as source of personal income, is not quite able to create significant 
number of jobs to allow job growth to keep up with the GDP growth. Corporate profit and gross private domestic 
investment variables which are statistically significant in the manufacturing job growth equation are not statistically 
significant in the services job growth equation. These are indications that private investment and corporate profit play 
important role in stimulating job growth in the manufacturing, more than they play in the services sector. The pressure 
to maintain this level of corporate profit is behind the manufacturing industry’s motivation to move plants overseas, 
especially to countries where low wage employees can be hired. We tested the effect of trade deficit on GDP growth 
rate, as well as on the overall and manufacturing job growth in the VAR model, and found that trade deficit 
significantly reduces the GDP growth rate, as well as the overall and manufacturing job growth.    
 
One of the ways by which we can prevent the relocation of manufacturing plants overseas is to enact an 
appropriate tax legislation providing greater incentives to encourage more domestic investments, and discourage 
relocation of manufacturing plants overseas. Businesses could be allowed to take tax write-offs for proven cases of 
authentic jobs created on minimum and above minimum wage rate. Alternatively, corporations seen to have 
abnormally high propensity to relocate their plants overseas, may be taxed at a relatively higher rate than their 
domestic counterparts. The effectiveness of a fiscal policy depends on whether it results in relatively more investment 
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spending, consumption or saving. To strengthen the effectiveness of the proposed tax policy, appropriate steps should 
be taken to ensure the highest level of investors’ confidence in the economy. Such steps include policy to reduce trade 
and budget deficits and guarantee the stability of the social security account. 
 
The VAR models reveal the overwhelming role played by M1, the ratio of gross private domestic investment 
to GDP, and consumer confidence index on GDP, overall job growth, and manufacturing and services job growth, as 
well as on unemployment. They also show that productivity increase leads to GDP growth slowdown and 
manufacturing job loss. The data, however show that, except for selected years between 1970 through 1999, 
productivity averaged at least 3.0, and except 1970, 1974-75, and 1990 average GDP growth rate was also at least 
3.0% per annum. During the period 2000 through 2002, average productivity growth was 3.9 while average GDP 
growth was 2.1% per annum. Except for selected years, consumer confidence index has been less than 100%. In 1999, 
the index shot up to 139, and dropped to 106.6% in 2001 and 96.6 in 2002. Given these statistics, high productivity 
cannot be interpreted to be contractionary, because it is not. If consumer and investors’ confidence are satisfactorily 
high, potential workers who cannot be hired in sectors where they do not possess the desired skills, could be employed 
in other sectors, where there is adequate investment to stimulate more output and employment growth. The models 
further demonstrate that when there is a simultaneous injection of monetary and fiscal expansion, the overall effect on 
job growth and unemployment reduction will be dominated by the monetary expansion because of its prompt effect on 
interest rate reduction and investment spending. It is not quite clear why similar results are not evident in the services 
sector. Robust corporate profits also tend to stimulate faster GDP growth, and job growth in the manufacturing, but 
not in the services sectors, although employee lay-offs are more often used in the manufacturing sectors as a cushion 
to prop-up corporate profits to prevent them from declining. 
 
Table 3 shows the percentage contributions of the variances accounted for by the GDP in overall job growth, 
and job growth in the manufacturing, services, as well as unemployment, when government spending and money 
supply are considered together, and when money supply is excluded. Although the VAR models show that not more 
than two lagged periods in the dependent variables can be included in the models, the horizon in the variance 
decomposition has been extended to ten years. The variance decomposition analysis shows that the GDP accounts for 
a higher proportion of the variances in overall job growth, manufacturing, and services job growth, especially when 
M1 is included in the VAR model. 
    
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The study shows that tax reduction and increased government spending, which are traditionally used to bring 
about economic expansion, are not always capable of bringing about a corresponding decrease in the unemployment 
rate. It is sometimes possible to achieve GDP growth, if such policies are supported with appropriate monetary 
expansion, but it may nevertheless not come with a corresponding amount of job growth.  
 
Although manufacturing has been declining since mid 1980’s, due to corporate outsourcing, which involves 
relocating of manufacturing plants overseas, that sector is more capable of bringing about the amount of job growth 
that may keep pace with the GDP growth rate. Strong job growth requires robust corporate profits and significant 
investment. Although the Services sector has been expanding since the 1980’s job growth has not always kept pace 
with the GDP growth rate because less than adequate corporate profits have been reported in those sectors. However, 
robust corporate profits and active investment spending which have been able to stimulate job growth in the 
manufacturing sectors have not produced such results in the services sectors.  
 
Monetary policy instrument is more effective in stimulating GDP expansion and comparable job growth, and 
hence in reducing unemployment rate, than fiscal innovation. One of the reasons for this is that fiscal innovations, 
which are not perceived by investors to be pro-investment, often result in low investors’ confidence. Except where 
there is a pervasive low investors’ confidence, monetary expansion generally results in increased investment due to 
low interest rate. Significant job creation generally occurs in the sectors in which significant investments take place, 
resulting in rapid GDP growth. 
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The failure to realize the anticipated job growth, following the enormous fiscal injection and tax reduction 
initiatives since 2001 is mostly due to three reasons: (1) The pervasive low investors’ confidence had drastically 
reduced the investors’ propensity to invest to the extent that little or no investment could take place, even if interest 
rate which had fallen to its lowest level could be allowed to fall further. (2) Many industrial sectors, still saturated 
with excess technological investment acquired in 1998-99 in their attempt to remain Y2K compatible, were trying to 
make effective use of their existing investment and hence had no justification for further investment spending, and this 
constrained their ability to expand production and create jobs. (3) The pressure to prevent corporate profits from 
falling had increased the motivation to move industrial plants overseas, especially to low wage countries. 
 
 
Table 1: (A) Unit Root Test 
 
Variable Augmented Dickey-Fuller            Philips-Perron  
  (ADF) Test                (PP) Test 
 
 Test  Critical  Test  Critical 
 Result Value   Result  Value 
 
Unemployment -4.28*   -3.04  -3.65  -2.20 
Productivity Manufacturing -2.64*  -1.36  -2.63  -1.90   
M1 -4.30*  -1.97  -3.66  -1.82 
Overall Job Growth  -3.66  -2.73  -4.27  -1.94 
Manufacturing Job Growth -3.65*  -1.33  -3.65  -1.14 
Services Job Growth -4.28*  -3.59  -3.66  -1.97 
Government Spending -4.27*  -2.95  -4.27  2.91 
Consumer Spending  -3.66*  -1.63  -4.28  -3.58 
Consumer Confidence Index -4.39*  -3.02  -3.65  -2.48 
Corporate Profit -4.28*  -2.15  -4.27  -1.97 
Inflation Rate -3.77*   -3.10  -4.30  -2.06 
Private Domestic Investment -3.66*  -2.56  -4.27  -1.71 
    
 
Table 1: (B) Test For Co-Integration (Trace Test) 
 
 r = 0    r1 
Test  Critical  Test  Critical  
    Statistics  Value  Statistics  Value 
 
GDP    16.88**  15.41  0.11   6.65 
Unemployment   30.37*  20.04  0.0005  6.65 
Overall Job Growth   30.37*  20.04  0.0005  6.26 
Manufacturing Job Growth  25.99*  20.04  0.10  6.65 
Job Growth (Services)   35.55**  20.04  4.81  3.76 
 
 
Table 1: (C) Test For Co-Integration (Maximum Eigenvalue Test) 
 
 r = 0    r1 
Test  Critical  Test  Critical  
    Statistics  Value  Statistics  Value 
 
GDP    16.77**  14.07   0.11  3.76 
Unemployment    30.36*  18.63  0.0005  6.65 
Overall Job Growth  30.36**  18.63  0.0005  3.76 
Manufacturing Job Growth 25.99*  20.04  0.10  6.65 
Job Growth (Services)  30.18*  18.63  4.81**  3.76 
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Table 2: Estimated Results Of The VAR Models 
 
Independent Variables   Dependent Variables 
 




Log(GDP(-1)) 1.00 - 1.00 - 1.00 - 1.00 - 
 
Log(JG(-1)) .59 - - - - - - - 
 (1.86)  
 
Log(JGM(-1)) - -.381 - - - - - - 
  (3.671)* 
 
Log(JGS(-1)) - - - - 0.864 - - - 
     (3.174)* 
 
Log(U(-1)) - - - - - - -0.057 - 
       (1.531) 
 




CointEq1 -0.574 -0.336 -0.913 -0.272 -0.517 -0.306 -0.581 1.039 
 (3.78)* (2.854)** (4.301)* (0.549) (4.011)* (4.241)* (3.452)* (0.990) 
 
Log(GDP(-1)) -0.039 0.254 0.053 0.558 -0.218 0.307 -0.038  -1.666 
 (0.198) (1.641) (0.291) (1.298) (1.008) (2.531)* (0.190) (1.341) 
 
Log(GDP(-2)) -.0.159 -0.120  -0.118 0.019 -0.161 0.053 -0.165 0.261  
 (0.866) (0.842) (0.0.649 (0.045) (0.944) (0.557) (0.880) (0.223) 
 
Log(JG(-1)) -0.062 -0.027 - - - - - - 
(0.265) (0.146) 
 
Log(JG(-2)) 0.290 -0.006 - - - - - - 
(1.568) (0.040) 
 
Log(JGM(-1)) - -  -.234 -0.536 - - - - 
   (2.596)**   (2.544)**    
 
Log(JGM(-2)) - - -0.096 -0.397 - - - - 
 (1.138) (2.020)** 
 
Log(JGS(-1)) - - - - 0.155 -0.049 - - 
(0.428) (-0.241) 
 
Log(JGS(-2)) - - - - 0.275 0.026 - - 
     (1.172) (0.201) 
 
Constant -4.575 -3.023 -6.676 -2.029 -4.578 -3.284 -3.995 9.106 
 (3.272)* (2.788)** (3.828)* (0.498) (3.449)* (4.417)* (2.915)* (1.066) 
 
Log(M1) -0.039 0.090 -0.071 0.284 -0.072 0.074 -0.018 -1.424 
 (1.050) (3.128)* (3.790)* (3.790)* (1.730) (3.145)* (0.450) (5.810)* 
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Def/y 0.133 -0.016 -0.150 -0.289 0.219 0.166 0.072 1.811 
 (1.194) (0.180) (1.639) (1.346) (1.751) (2.373)** (0.627) (2.514)**  
 
Log(CP) 0.052 0.021 0.054 0.116 0.075 0.001 0.039 -0.061 
 (2.468)** (1.296) (2.606)** (2.387)** (3.392)* (0.084) (1.698) (0.428) 
 
Log(PRMAN) -.005 -0.001 -.001 -0.008 -0.005 0.0005 -0.005 0.014 
 (2.187)** (0.645) (0.599) (1.322) (2.430)** (0.399) (1.998)** (0.913) 
 
Log(CS) 0.603 0.290 0.770 -.059 0.610 0.330 0.517 0.060 
 (3.127)* (1.942)*** (3.682)* (0.121) (3.392)* (3.277)* (2.789)** (0.052) 
 
Log(I/Y) 0.182 0.080 0.115 0.191  0.046 -0.0009 0.082 -1.233 
 (1.751)*** (2.222)** (2.719)** (1.932)* (0.919) (0.033) (1.605) (3.888)* 
 
Log(CCI) -0.018 0.030 -0.002 0.059 -0.026 0.032 -0.007 -0.461 
 (0.966) (2.092)** (0.182) (1.854)*** (1.116) (2.492)** (0.400) (3.862)* 
 
R-Squared 0.945 0.927 0.954 0.845 0.943 0.930 0.938 0.922 
F-Statistic 21.345 15.833 23.976 6.831 20.878 16.555 18.873 14.900 
Akaika AIC -6.402 -6.911 -6.512 -4.816 -6.381 -7.541 -6.286 -2.626 
Log Likelihood 106.633 109.754 104.174 80.430 102.340 118.571 101.010 49.767 
 
*Statistically Significant at 1% level;  **Statistically Significant at5% level 
 
List and Description of Variables Used 
 
y   =  gross domestic product 
prman =  productivity (manufacturing) 
def/y =  government spending as ratio of GDP 
i/y  =  gross private domestic investment as share of GDP 
cs  =  private consumption spending 
cci =  consumer confidence index 
jg  =  overall job growth 
jgm =  manufacturing job growth 
jgs  =  job growth (services) 
u  = unemployment rate 
cp  =  corporate profit 
 
 
Table 3: Variance Decomposition - Proportion Of Variances 
Explained By Shock To Independent Variables On The Dependent 
Variables 
 
Shock to log(GDP) When M1 is included in the VAR Model 
 
Period Standard Error GDP Overall Job Growth 
1 0.008 100.00 0.00 
2 0.009 92.67 7.32 
3 0.009 92.14 7.86 
4 0.009 89.51 10.48 
5 0.010 83.21 16.79 
6 0.010 80.02 19.98 
7 0.010 76.85 23.15 
8 0.011 73.45 26.55 
9 0.011 70.89 29.11 
10 0.011 68.43 31.57 
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Shock to log(GDP) on JGS When M1 is included in the VAR Model 
 
Period Standard Error GDP JGS 
1 0.008 100.00 0.00 
2 0.009 97.59 2.41 
3 0.009 96.95 3.05 
4 0.009 92.99 7.01 
5 0.010 89.10 10.89 
6 0.010 86.55 13.45 
7 0.010 84.16 15.84 
8 0.011 82.10 17.90 
9 0.011 80.37 19.62  
10 0.011 78.77 21.23 
 
Shock to Log(GDP) on JGM When M1 is included in the VAR Model 
 
Period Standard Error GDP JGM 
1 0.008 100.00 0.00  
2 0.008 96.42 3.58 
3 0.009 85.55 14.45 
4 0.010 77.95 22.05 
5 0.011 73.16 26.84 
6 0.012 67.84 32.15 
7 0.013 63.55 36.45 
8 0.013 60.53 39.46 
9 0.014 57.79 42.21 
10 0.015 55.45 44.55 
 
Shock to Log(GDP) on U When M1 is included in VAR Model 
 
Period Standard Error GDP U 
1 0.009 100.00 0.00 
2 0.009 96.19 3.806 
3 0.009 96.148 3.852 
4 0.009 95.254 4.746  
5 0.010 91.249 8.751 
6 0.010  90.010 9.990  
7 0.010 88.735 11.265  
8 0.010 86.329 13.671 
9 0.010 84.712 15.287 
10 0.010 83.271 16.729 
 
Shock to Log(GDP) on JG When M1 is Excluded from VAR Model 
 
Period Standard Error DP JG 
1 0.009 100.00 0.00 
2 0.012 84.99 15.01 
3 0.013 81.68 18.32 
4 0.015 79.44 20.56 
5  0.017 75.15 24.84 
6 0.019 73.51 26.49 
7 0.020 72.33 27.66 
8 0.022 71.28 28.72 
9 0.023 70.73 29.27 
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Shock to Log(GDP) on JGS When M1 is Excluded from VAR Model 
 
Period Standard Error GDP JGS 
1 0.010 100.00 0.00 
2  0.012 91.18 8.81 
3 0.014 89.17 10.83 
4 0.016 87.81 12.18 
5 0.018 86.60 13.39 
6 0.020 86.19 13.81 
7 0.022 85.99 14.01 
8 0.023 85.88 14.12 
9 0.025 85.82 14.17 
10 0.026 85.76 14.23 
 
Shock to Log(GDP) on JGM When M1 is Excluded from VAR Model 
 
Period Standard Error GDP JGM 
1 0.009 100.00 0.00 
2 0.010 93.28 6.72 
3 0.011 84.70 15.30 
4 0.013 82.83 17.17 
5 0.014 80.80 19.19 
6 0.015 78.76 21.24 
7 0.016 77.73 22.26 
8 0.017 76.81 23.19 
9 0.018 75.93 24.07 
10 0.019 75.33 24.67 
 
Shock to Log(JGS) on U When M1 is included in the VAR Model 
 
Period Standard Error JGS U 
1 0.005 68.76 31.23 
2 0.006 62.62 37.38 
3 0.007 55.98 44.02 
4 0.007 52.70 47.30 
5 0.008 52.03 47.97 
6 0.008 51.28 48.71 
7 0.008 49.44 50.56 
8 0.009 47.31 52.69 
9 0.009 45.47 54.53 
10 0.009 43.84 56.16 
 
Shock to Log(JGM) on U When M1 is included in the VAR Model 
 
Period Standard Error JGM U 
1 0.019 87.48 12.52 
2 0.023 88.83 11.19 
3 0.025 86.64 13.36 
4 0.029 85.03 14.96 
5 0.031 85.86 14.13 
6 0.034 86.01 13.99 
7 0.036 85.33 14.67 
8 0.038 85.20 14.80 
9 0.040 85.34 14.65 
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Shock to Log(JG) on U When M1 is included in the VAR Model 
 
Period Standard Error JG U 
 
1 0.005 35.68 64.31 
2 0.005 34.05 65.94 
3 0.006 37.86 62.13 
4 0.008 49.03 50.97 
5 0.009 57.13 42.87 
6 0.010 58.76 41.24 
7 0.011 56.50 43.50 
8 0.011 54.36 45.64 
9 0.011 52.78 47.22 
10 0.012 51.73 48.20 
 
Shock to Log(JGS) on U When M1 is excluded from the VAR Model 
 
Period Standard Error JGS U 
1 0.005 70.40 29.60 
2 0.006 61.83 38.17 
3 0.007 51.41 48.59 
4 0.008 45.81 54.19 
5 0.009 46.10 53.89 
6 0.010 47.91 52.08 
7 0.011 48.62 51.37 
8 0.012 48.61 51.39 
9 0.012 48.49 51.51 
10 0.013 48.19 51.50 
 
Shock to Log(JG) on U When M1 is excluded from the VAR Model 
 
Period Standard Error JG U 
1 0.005 44.43 55.57 
2 0.005 40.24 59.75 
3 0.006 41.86 58.14 
4 0.011 46.66 53.34 
5 0.017 55.32 44.68 
6 0.022 59.05 40.95 
7 0.027 59.89 40.11 
8 0.031 60.71 39.29 
9 0.034 61.20 38.80 
10 0.038 61.35 38.65 
 
Shock to Log(JGM) on U When M1 is excluded from VAR Model 
 
Period Standard Error JGM U 
1 0.022 100.00 0.00 
2 0.026 96.49 3.51 
3 0.026 96.31 3.69 
4 0.027 92.50 7.50 
5 0.028 92.18 7.82 
6 0.028 92.37 7.63 
7 0.029 92.47 7.53 
8 0.029 92.21 7.78 
9 0.029 91.91 8.08 
 0.030 91.73 8.27 
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